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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Senior Review Panel

NIC-00600-88

10 March 1988

*part to the paper.**Call- I agree with the SRP that the paper needs much work; probably your own pen (and [unclear]) should be part to the paper.**Frank*

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Review Panel Comments on Draft
SNIE 56-88: The Philippines: Problems
and Prospects for the Aquino Government
(Fast-Track), internally dated 3 March 1988

1. The Panel continues to believe that conditions in the Philippines warrant a crisp, condensed, and pointed SNIE, and in four separate memoranda we have spelled out our concerns. This precoordination draft does not fill the bill.

2. In an initial memorandum of 24 September 1987, we spelled out six specific areas where we felt trends were converging toward an impending crisis and which we felt had not been sufficiently dealt with in Community estimates. In response to a first draft Concept Paper/TOR on 3 November, we noted that most of the trends about which we were concerned were not dealt with and that the project was almost exclusively Aquino-centered. Our response to the first draft of SNIE 56-2-87 was that it was "unduly prescriptive" and varied substantially from its Concept Paper/TOR, and lacked intelligence to support many of its propositions. On 10 December we were less than enthused with a new draft Concept Paper/TOR, and we once again spelled out the six items which we felt were critical to the Estimate. They had not been dealt with. We stressed again that the SNIE "should not involve specific policy recommendations."

3. The Panel can only express disappointment with the current draft, even though some of the important trends about which we were concerned are being dealt with, albeit in less than organized fashion. But this draft is not an Intelligence Estimate. In its present form, it is a Policy Paper. A quick glance at the "Executive Summary" reveals such items as: "civilian authorities need to play an integral role"; "The

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President . . . must set priorities"; "Local authorities must set priorities"; Manila "will also need to reform"; "steps we believe are necessary to shape the AFP"; or "speedy implementation of a land reform program, greater crop diversification, and more rural infrastructure are urgently needed."


4. An SNIE which presents the facts as we know them and projects possible trends in critical areas together with alternatives is indeed needed for the Philippines as we approach the crunch on base negotiations. In the estimative process it is probably better not to stress what "we believe" (the phrase is used ten times in just the "Executive Summary") or that "we are concerned" or "we are encouraged." These are policymaker expressions. Surely our intelligence on the Philippines is sufficient for us to draft out what "we know," not just what we believe, especially if, as in this case, the beliefs are linked to policy prescriptions, which is the impression the reader gathers in several instances.

5. This leads to a second general area of concern. The draft, in its present form, lacks specifics--though some of them are supplied in the Boxes and in the Annex. The policymaker will want some of these in the text: What are the trade and aid statistics? What is the tenancy situation which calls out for land reform? What are the specifics about Mrs. Aquino's relatives which are referred to in the text? How about an estimate, with an example, of the degree of corruption? What are the areas controlled by the insurgents, both Communist and Moro? Specifically, what are the "intractable cultural and historical traditions"?

6. The present draft remains imprecise with regard to its estimative time frame. The reader gets a menu ranging from "one year" to a "few years," to a "couple of years," to "the next several years," and "to 1990." Incidentally, Aquino's term ends in 1992.

7. The draft, pages 34-36, mentions some "key indicators" with regard to government performance. We find here the same tendency toward prescription on the part of the drafters. The "indicators" are phrased in terms of what the government "must" do. For an intelligence estimate a "key indicator" would be something more like "the willingness of local government officials to reside in areas they govern," mentioned earlier in the draft (page 17).

8. The Panel is convinced that this draft SNIE requires a rigorous tightening, reorganization to parallel the format of the Key Questions and Key Judgments, and more pointed adducing of





intelligence to make clear to the policymaker/reader the seriousness of the impending crisis in the Philippines.

9. A final note: Box 3 on Government Spending is essentially a comparison between Thailand and the Philippines. This could prove confusing, could distract attention from the nature of the government program, and could lead to comparisons which are not necessarily valid or of value.


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